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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In two decisions rendered in two recent terms, the United States Supreme 
Court has struck down, as violative of the First Amendment, two provisions of 
the federal Lanham Act that barred the registration of certain kinds of 
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trademarks.1  In Matal v. Tam,2 the Court invalidated the section of the statute 
that prohibited the registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises . . . 
matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or 
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”3  In Iancu v. Bru-
netti,4 the Court invalidated another part of the very same statutory section, 
namely the prohibition of registration of a mark which “[c]onsists of or com-
prises  immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”5  The constitutional problem, in each 
case, was that the prohibition amounted to impermissible viewpoint discrimi-
nation.6  But while the ruling in Tam was unanimous, the decision in Brunetti 
was not, and the multiple opinions written in Brunetti raise some important 
questions regarding (a) the constitutionality of other provisions of the Lanham 
Act (including possible amendments in the wake of Brunetti); and (b) the po-
tential resolution of issues that may arise outside the narrow context of trade-
mark registration.   
This article offers some preliminary thoughts concerning the possible im-
plications of Tam and Brunetti.  I begin with a brief primer on trademark law, 
for the benefit of readers who lack expertise therein. 
II.  THE BASICS OF AMERICAN TRADEMARK LAW 
To understand these decisions, one must have some minimal acquaintance 
with American trademark law.  A mark serves as an indication of the source of 
goods or services,7 and one acquires ownership of a mark by being the first to 
use it, in commerce,8 in a particular location.9  Ownership of a mark entitles 
one to prevent the use of a mark, by someone else, that is likely to create con-
sumer confusion as to the source or sponsorship of that second user’s mark10–
and the owner of a mark has that right under the common law of every state;11 
 
1.   A “trademark,” according to the Lanham Act, “includes any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof–used. . .to identify and distinguish [one’s] goods . . . and to indicate the 
source of the goods.”  A “service mark” is defined almost identically, but with reference to “services” 
instead of “goods.”  15 U.S.C. sec. 1127.  There are no significant legal consequences flowing from 
the distinction.  J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 4:7 (5th ed. 2019).  In this 
article, I will use the term “trademark,” or “mark,” to refer to both trademarks and service marks.   
2.   137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
3.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
4.   139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019). 
5.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
6.   137 S. Ct. at 1751; 139 S. Ct. at 2297. 
7.   MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2001). 
8.   B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015). 
9.   Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1394 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
10.   15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trustees v. Fla. Nat’l Univ., 830 F.3d 1242, 1255 
(11th Cir. 2016). 
11.    Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 915–16 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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registration of the mark is not required. Registration is an option, however, both 
at the state12 and federal level, and, as one would expect, registration provides 
certain benefits.  At the federal level, one may apply for registration at the fed-
eral Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),13 pursuant to the Lanham Act, and the 
application will be approved if the PTO is satisfied that the applicant is the first 
user of the mark, the mark has been used in interstate commerce,14 and that it 
is otherwise eligible for federal registration.  The primary criterion for eligibil-
ity is that the mark be “distinctive”–i.e., that it is capable of distinguishing the 
applicant’s goods or services from those of others.15  The Lanham Act sets out 
several categories of marks that are ineligible for registration.16  Some of those 
categories bear a clear relationship to the overriding statutory goals of prevent-
ing consumer confusion or deception;17 notably, one presumptively cannot reg-
ister a mark that “so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark 
Office, or a mark . . . previously used . . ., as to be likely . . . to cause confu-
sion.”18  Other  presumptively unregistrable marks, such as those that are 
“merely descriptive”19 or “primarily geographically descriptive,”20 lack the req-
uisite distinctiveness.21  But some of the statutory bars to registration,22 like 
those at issue in Tam and Brunetti, which date back to the Act’s inception in 
1946, serve other, unidentified policy goals.23  Thus, for example, one cannot 
 
12.   Gene Quinn, State vs. Federal Trademarks, Which is Right for Your Business?, IP Watchdog 
(Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/25/state-federal-trademarks-right-busi-
ness/id=90214/. 
13.   15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). 
14.   Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
15.   15 U.S.C. § 1052. 
16.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)–(e). 
17.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“deceptive”), (e)(1) (“deceptively misdescriptive”), and (e)(3) (“pri-
marily geographically deceptively misdescriptive”). 
18.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).  But, “if the [PTO] determines that confusion…is not likely to result 
from the continued use by more than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and 
limitations as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods on or in connection with which 
such marks are used, concurrent registrations may be issued to such persons . . . .”  Id. 
19.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1). 
20.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2).   
21.   But these types of marks, along with some others, may acquire the requisite distinctiveness—
commonly called “secondary meaning”—over time, and thus be entitled to registration.  See text at 
note 166, infra, and 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
22.   See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)–(c), and text at notes 176-88, infra. 
23.   “The central purpose of trademark registration is to facilitate source identification . . . 
Whether a mark is disparaging bears no plausible relation to that goal.”  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 
1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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register a mark which consists of a national flag,24 or (presumptively) the name 
of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his widow.25  
When federal registration is denied by virtue of one of these provisions, the 
mark owner may nonetheless continue to use the mark in commerce.26  What, 
then, does a mark owner lose by failing to attain federal registration of a mark?  
Registration on the so-called “principal register”27 confers a variety of benefits, 
most notably these: prima facie evidence of the validity and ownership of a 
mark, and the exclusive right to use it;28 a nationwide right of priority with 
respect to the mark;29 constructive notice, to the world, of the registrant’s claim 
of ownership of the mark;30 the possible attainment of “incontestability” of the 
mark;31 and the right to use, with the mark, one of the forms of notice of regis-
tration set forth in the statute.32  The essential point is that denial of federal 
registration, on the basis of the content of the mark, does not prevent use of the 
mark, but does deprive the owner of some significant benefits.33   
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT RULINGS 
A.  Prior to Tam 
What, then, was the proper judicial response to a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a statutory bar to registration based on the content of a mark?  Note, 
 
24.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(b).   
25.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(c). 
26.   Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Whether a mark that is unregistrable federally may be registered at the state level is not entirely 
clear.  Compare In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), with id. at 1375 (Lourie, 
J., dissenting). 
27.   Everything I have said about federal trademark registration, thus far, has been said with 
reference to the PTO’s so-called “principal register.”  15 U.S.C. § 1051–52.  There is also a “supple-
mental register,” 15 U.S.C. § 1091, on which registration is easier, but which affords far fewer benefits.  
15 U.S.C. § 1094. 
28.   15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). 
29.   15 U.S.C. § 1057(c).  This means that, contrary to the common law rule (pursuant to which 
trademark rights can be enforced only in geographic areas in which the mark owner uses the mark), a 
federal registrant enjoys exclusive rights, with regard to use of the mark, even in states in which the 
registrant has never used it.  But that priority must yield to common law rights established by use of 
the same or similar mark, prior to federal registration, in a particular geographic area.  15 U.S.C. § 
1115(b)(5).  See Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1395 (3rd Cir. 
1985).  
30.   15 U.S.C. § 1072. 
31.   Id. § 1115(b).  Whereas registration equals prima facie evidence of validity, ownership, and 
exclusive right to use a mark, “incontestability,” achieved over time, confers “conclusive evidence” of 
those legal consequences.  See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
32.   Id. § 1111. 
33.   See also 15 U.S.C. § 1124, which provides a registered trademark owner protection against 
importation of infringing merchandise. 
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first, that trademarks have been treated as forms of speech, thereby bringing the 
First Amendment into play.34  Most marks, by far, would be viewed as exem-
plars of “commercial speech,”35 which explains why the prevention of use of a 
mark which is likely to create consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship 
poses no First Amendment problem; “false or misleading” commercial speech 
receives no First Amendment protection.36  But a mark, particularly a service 
mark, will not necessarily be deemed “commercial.”37  Should a content-based 
ban on registration of a mark be subjected, then, to the well-established analysis 
for determining the constitutionality of regulations of commercial speech,38 or 
perhaps to strict judicial scrutiny, as content-based regulations of speech other-
wise usually are?39   
Consider now the meaning of the two provisions at issue in Tam and Bru-
netti. 
Case law established that the determination of whether a mark was “dispar-
aging” (at least in the context of disparagement of an identified group,40 as in 
Tam) was to be determined by looking to the reactions of a substantial compo-
site of the allegedly disparaged group.41  Were ordinary First Amendment prin-
ciples to be employed, this provision would surely be stricken as an instance of 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.42   
As to “scandalous or immoral” marks (the subject of Brunetti), courts often 
said this: “In order to prove that [a] mark is scandalous, the PTO must demon-
strate that the mark is ‘shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; 
disgraceful; offensive; disreputable . . . .”43  Alternatively, it was said: “A 
 
34.   “Today, however, it is unquestionably true that trademarks are protected speech under Su-
preme Court commercial speech jurisprudence. . ..[T]he Supreme Court held that the trade name of an 
optometrist is commercial speech.  Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). . ..Because a trademark 
identifies the source of a product or service for users, it is protected commercial speech.” In re Tam, 
785 F.3d 567, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., “additional views”).  See also Rubin v. Coors Brewing 
Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).  The Supreme Court, in Tam, appeared to view this conclusion as too clear 
to even warrant any comment. 
35.   Commercial speech is most often described, for First Amendment purposes, as “speech 
which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 
463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
36.   Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
37.   See text at notes 143–46, infra.   
38.   See text at note 148, infra. 
39.   Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015). 
40.   As Justice Alito stated in Tam: “A mark that disparages a ‘substantial’ percentage of the 
members of a racial or ethnic group necessarily disparages many ‘persons,’ namely, members of that 
group.”  137 S. Ct. at 1756 (citation omitted). 
41.   Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 124-25 (D.D.C. 2003). 
42.   See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). 
43.   In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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showing that a mark is vulgar is sufficient to establish that it ‘consists of or 
comprises immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”44  Whether “commercial” or not, 
should the impediment to registering a “vulgar” mark have been stricken pur-
suant to the courts’ longstanding protection of “offensive” speech?45  
 But recall that even an unregistered mark may be used and may receive 
protection under the common law.  Until Tam, the prevailing judicial view 
(which I will call the “minimal burden” approach) appeared to be, as one court 
expressed it, that “the refusal to register a mark does not proscribe any conduct 
or suppress any form of expression because it does not affect the applicant’s 
right to use the mark in question.”46  Denial of registration was therefore not 
seen as a burden on speech sufficient to trigger any First Amendment analysis.   
B.  Tam 
These bars to registration thus appeared to be constitutionally unproblem-
atic, until Tam’s challenge to the “disparagement” clause reached the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Tam, the lead singer of a band called “The 
Slants,” sought federal registration of “THE SLANTS” as a service mark, but 
the PTO rejected his application as “disparaging” to Asians.  Based on circuit 
precedent, the Court rejected Tam’s First Amendment challenge to the statutory 
ban on registration of such words, but offered a separate opinion in which Judge 
Moore called for the Court to revisit that governing precedent.47  That led to 
that court’s en banc ruling, which did just that, and invalidated the ban on reg-
istration of “disparaging” marks.48  Denial of registration, said Judge Moore, 
had “a chilling effect on speech.”49  The Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed,50 without even commenting explicitly on the minimal-burden approach 
that had held sway for so long.  
The ruling was squarely based on the concept of viewpoint discrimination.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito stated that the disparagement provision “of-
fends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the 
 
44.   In re The Boulevard Entertainment, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
45.   See text at notes 196–98, infra. 
46.   In re The Boulevard Entertainment, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1343; accord, In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 
572 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Mavety Media Group, 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re McGinley, 
660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A.1981). That most of these rulings were made by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is no accident; per the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a), that is the 
appellate court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from denials of registration by the PTO. (The prede-
cessor to that court, up until 1982, was the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.) 
47.   In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 573 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., “additional views”). 
48.   In re Tam 808 F.3d 1321, 1339–55 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
49.   Id. at 1345. 
50.   137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
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ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”51  But beyond that key assertion (and 
the Court’s rejection of Tam’s statutory argument52 and the PTO’s “government 
speech” argument53), unity gave way to two separate opinions, each represent-
ing the views of four Justices.54  The government, of necessity, had argued that 
the usual rules of First Amendment analysis (identified above) should not be 
applied in this context.  In furtherance of this attempt to escape heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny, the government argued that the PTO’s registration scheme 
should be (a) deemed to be “government speech;” (b) analogized to government 
programs subsidizing speech; or (c) analyzed “under a new doctrine that would 
apply to ‘government-program’ cases.”55  Each of these positions was essen-
tially, if not formally, a “minimal burden” argument, and Alito rejected each 
one in turn,56 joined by only three Justices except in his repudiation of the “gov-
ernment speech” argument.  Perhaps notably, in his rejection of the “govern-
ment program” argument, Alito said this: 
Potentially more analogous are cases in which a unit of government 
creates a limited public forum for private speech.  When government 
creates such a forum, in either a literal or “metaphysical” sense, some 
content- and speaker-based restrictions may be allowed.  However, 
even in such cases, what we have termed “viewpoint discrimination” is 
forbidden. 
 
Our cases use the term “viewpoint” discrimination in a broad sense, and 
in that sense, the disparagement clause discriminates on the bases of 
“viewpoint” . . . . Giving offense is a viewpoint.57  
In a footnote, he added: “We leave open the question whether this is the 
appropriate framework for analyzing free speech challenges to provisions of 
the Lanham Act.”58 
 
51.   Id. at 1751. 
52.   Id. at 1755–56. 
53.   Id. at 1757–60. 
54.   Justice Gorsuch took no part in the decision.  Id. at 1750. 
55.   Id. at 1757–63. 
56.   Id. 
57.   Id. at 1763.  Justice Alito’s assertion, in Tam, that “giving offense” invariably amounts to 
viewpoint discrimination has been appropriately criticized.  Clay Calvert, Merging Offensive-Speech 
Cases With Viewpoint-Discrimination Principles: The Immediate Impact of Matal v. Tam on Two 
Strands of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 27 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 829 (2019).  The con-
curring opinions in Brunetti, see the discussion at notes 77–100 infra, bolster the argument that Alito’s 
generalization was overbroad.  See also Kent Greenfield, Trademarks, Hate Speech, and Solving a 
Puzzle of Viewpoint Bias, 2019 S. CT. REV. 183, 219–23. 
58.   Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 n. 16. 
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Finally, Alito—again writing only for four Justices—brushed aside the 
government’s argument that the disparagement clause should survive as a reg-
ulation of commercial speech, declining to decide whether commercial-speech 
analysis was applicable here because the clause would fail to withstand even 
that lower level of scrutiny.59  No matter how the government interest underly-
ing the provision is articulated, he said, “its unmistakable thrust is this: The 
Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend 
. . . . [T]hat idea strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.”60  
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, joined by three other Justices, 
asserting that “the viewpoint discrimination rationale renders unnecessary any 
extended treatment of other questions raised by the parties.”61  What appeared 
notable, at the time he wrote them, were these general statements by Justice 
Kennedy concerning viewpoint discrimination: 
As the Court is correct to hold, § 1052(a) constitutes viewpoint discrim-
ination–a form of speech suppression so potent that it must be subject 
to rigorous constitutional scrutiny.  The Government’s action and the 
statute on which it is based cannot survive this scrutiny.62 
 
A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint is an “egregious form 
of content discrimination,” which is “presumptively unconstitu-
tional.”63 
 
[T]he viewpoint based discrimination at issue here necessarily invokes 
heightened scrutiny.64 
 
“Commercial speech is no exception,” the Court has explained, to the 
principle that the First Amendment “requires heightened scrutiny when-
ever the government creates a regulation of speech because of disagree-
ment with the message it conveys.”65  
But compare: 
 
59.   Id. at 1763-65.  He added, in a footnote, that “we leave open the question whether Central 
Hudson provides the appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges to provisions of the Lanham 
Act.”  Id. at 1764, n. 17. 
60.   Id. at 1764. 
61.   Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
62.   Id. 
63.   Id. at 1766 (quoting Kennedy’s opinion in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995)).  
64.   Id. at 1767. 
65.   Id., quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011). 
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[C]ommercial speech . . . does not serve as a blanket exemption from 
the First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality.66  
And: 
It is telling that the Court’s precedents have recognized just one narrow 
situation in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible: where the 
government itself is speaking or recruiting others to communicate a 
message on its behalf.67 
The first four statements, by referring expressly or impliedly to “heightened 
scrutiny,” suggest that a finding of viewpoint discrimination does not end the 
analysis.  But the latter two statements arguably imply the contrary, as do the 
pertinent pronouncements of Justice Alito—who said nothing in his opinion 
about any “scrutiny” of viewpoint discrimination.  So, which is it?  We will 
return to this point. 
C.  Brunetti 
The inevitable question, in Tam’s wake, was the constitutionality of the 
Lanham Act’s ban on registration of “immoral or scandalous” marks.68  The 
answer was not long in coming; two years after Tam, the Supreme Court, ruling 
on a facial challenge brought by a maker of clothing who sought to register the 
mark “FUCT,” held that this provision embodied the same fatal flaw as did the 
disparagement clause: viewpoint discrimination.69  As Justice Kagan wrote, for 
the Court: 
So the Lanham Act allows registration of marks when their messages 
accord with, but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of de-
cency or propriety.  Put the pair of overlapping terms together and the 
statute, on its face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: 
those aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to 
them; those inducing societal nods of approval and those provoking 
 
66.   Id. 
67.   Id. at 1768.  I would contend that, in making this statement, Justice Kennedy overlooked two 
special contexts in which viewpoint discrimination is apparently permitted—namely, in the context of 
speech by a public high school student, see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 437 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); and speech by a government employee, see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152-54 
(1983). 
68.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).  As Justice Kagan explained, “[t]he PTO applies that bar as a ‘unitary 
provision,’ rather than treating the two adjectives in it separately.”  Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 
2298. 
69.   Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297. 
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offense and condemnation.  The statute favors the former, and disfavors 
the latter.70 
The government’s primary argument consisted of urging the Court to ac-
cept a limiting construction of the statutory language at issue, as follows: 
The Government’s idea, abstractly phrased, is to narrow the statutory 
bar to “marks that are offensive [or] shocking to a substantial segment 
of the public because of their mode of expression, independent of any 
views that they may express.”  More concretely, the Government ex-
plains that this reinterpretation would mostly restrict the PTO to refus-
ing marks that are “vulgar”–meaning “lewd,” “sexually explicit or pro-
fane.”  Such a reconfigured bar, the government says, would not turn 
on viewpoint, and so we could uphold it.71  
But, Kagan replied, “even assuming the Government’s reading would elim-
inate First Amendment problems, we may adopt it only if we can see it in the 
statutory language,” but “we cannot.”72   
Interestingly, Kagan, having found viewpoint discrimination, would not al-
low the government to try to save the provision at issue by arguing that its over-
breadth was not “substantial.”73  “[T]his Court,” she wrote, “has never applied 
that kind of analysis to a viewpoint-discriminatory law.”74  The finding of view-
point discrimination in Tam, she added, “ended the matter.”75   
The thrust of the majority opinion was thus quite straightforward.  Kagan 
added, in a footnote: 
We say nothing at all about a statute . . . limited to lewd, sexually ex-
plicit, and profane marks.  Nor do we say anything about how to 
 
70.   Id. at 2300. 
71.   Id. at 2301. 
72.   Id.  
73.   Id. at 2302.  As I recently explained: 
“Facial overbreadth . . . means, in essence . . . that a law may be invalidated under the 
First Amendment if it prohibits too much speech–’too much’ being understood as ex-
cessive in relation to an acceptable justification for official restraint. Such a law is thus 
said to be ‘overbroad’ . . . . For the doctrine to work, the speaker must persuade a court 
that the law is ‘substantially’ overbroad, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly le-
gitimate sweep. . ..” 
Marc Rohr, Parallel Doctrinal Bars: The Unexplained Relationship Between Facial Overbreadth and 
“Scrutiny” Analysis in the Law of Freedom of Speech, 11 ELON L. REV. 95, 98–99 (2019), quoting 
U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010).  
74.   Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302. 
75.   Id. 
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evaluate viewpoint-neutral restrictions on trademark registration, be-
cause the “scandalous” bar . . . is not one.76 
But other Justices did offer thoughts concerning such restrictions. 
First, consider the brief concurring opinion of Justice Alito, in which he 
said this: “Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a more care-
fully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar 
terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.”77  He cited no authority, 
and made no attempt to place this conclusion in the context of any doctrinal 
analysis.  Did he mean to suggest that, for such “vulgar” words and phrases, no 
First Amendment analysis was required?  (I will refer to this as the “low-value 
speech” approach.) 
Consider next the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting in part.  In 
his view, the “scandalous” part of the provision at issue was susceptible of a 
saving narrowing construction: 
Standing alone, the term “scandalous” need not be understood to reach 
marks that offend because of the ideas they convey; it can be read more 
narrowly to bar only marks that offend because of their mode of expres-
sion–marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane . . . . 
 
[R]efusing registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not 
offend the First Amendment.  Whether such marks can be registered 
does not affect the extent to which their owners may use them in com-
merce to identify goods.  No speech is being restricted; no one is being 
punished.  The owners of such marks are merely denied certain addi-
tional benefits associated with federal trademark registration.78 
Roberts, then, appeared to be breathing life into the “minimal burden” ap-
proach to trademark-registration restrictions, an approach that had seemingly 
been discarded by Tam; viewpoint discrimination would not be allowed, even 
in that setting, but other limitations might be, without recourse to the usual rules 
of First Amendment analysis.  As to what mode of analysis should apply, Rob-
erts was unclear.  He added these comments: 
The Government, meanwhile, has an interest in not associating itself 
with trademarks whose content is obscene, vulgar, or profane.  The First 
Amendment protects the freedom of speech; it does not require the 
 
76.   Id. at 2302, n. *. 
77.   Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring). 
78.   Id.  (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Government to give aid and comfort to those using obscene, vulgar, and 
profane modes of expression.79  
Any restriction of that kind would, of course, be content-based, a fact that 
usually leads to strict judicial scrutiny.  The “minimal burden” approach, how-
ever, clearly points away from that high bar—but to what alternative level of 
scrutiny?  Roberts’ brief opinion stopped short of connecting his inclinations to 
established First Amendment doctrine. 
Justice Sotomayor, however, made the connection clear in her opinion, a 
partial dissent in which Justice Breyer joined.80  Like Roberts, Sotomayor 
would have given the word “scandalous” a saving narrowing construction,81 
and relied on the minimal-burden approach to uphold the ban on registration of 
“scandalous” marks.82   
As to the first point, Justice Sotomayor said this: 
[W]hile the majority offers a reasonable reading of “scandalous,” it . . . 
unnecessarily and ill-advisedly collapses the words “scandalous” and 
“immoral.”  Instead, it should treat them as each holding a distinct, non-
redundant meaning, with “immoral” covering marks that are offensive 
because they transgress social norms, and “scandalous” covering marks 
that are offensive because of the mode in which they are expressed. 
 
What would it mean for “scandalous” in § 1052(a) to cover only offen-
sive modes of expression?  The most obvious ways–indeed, perhaps the 
only conceivable ways–in which a trademark can be expressed in a 
shocking or offensive manner are when the speaker employs obscenity, 
vulgarity, or profanity . . . . As for what constitutes “scandalous” vul-
garity or profanity, I do not offer a list, but I do interpret the term to 
allow the PTO to restrict . . . the small group of lewd words or “swear” 
words that cause a visceral reaction, that are not commonly used around 
children, and that are prohibited in comparable settings.83 
As to the second point, she said this: 
Here, however, the question is only whether the Government must be 
forced to provide the ancillary benefit of trademark registration to . . . 
trademarks that use even the most extreme obscenity, vulgarity, or 
 
79.   Id. at 2303–04. 
80.   Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
81.   Id. at 2309–11. 
82.   Id. at 2313–17. 
83.   Id. at 2311. 
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profanity.  The stakes are far removed from a situation in which, say, 
Brunetti was facing a threat to his liberty, or even his right to use and 
enforce his trademark in commerce.84 
In answering “no” to the question she posed, Sotomayor provided a doctri-
nal basis for her conclusion: 
Properly narrowed, “scandalous” is a viewpoint-neutral form of content 
discrimination that is permissible in the kind of discretionary govern-
mental program or limited forum typified by the trademark-registration 
system.85 
She explained that “[w]hen the Court has talked about government initia-
tives like this one before,” it has usually spoken in terms of “limited public (or 
nonpublic) forum” (sic) or “government programs or subsidies.”86  Under either 
conceptual approach, she correctly asserted, “reasonable, viewpoint-neutral 
content discrimination is generally permissible.”87   
As a matter of established legal rules, this conclusion is more easily under-
stood in connection with “public forum” doctrine, which, while less than per-
fectly coherent,88 makes quite clear that a restriction of speech in a “limited” 
forum89 or a “nonpublic” forum90 need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neu-
tral.91  Recall that, in Tam, Justice Alito, writing for four Justices, had left open 
the question of whether the “limited public forum” analogy was apt in this 
 
84.   Id. at 2312. 
85.   Id. at 2313. 
86.   Id. at 2316, citing Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), and National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
87.   Id. at 2316–17.   
88.   See Marc Rohr, First Amendment Fora Revisited: How Many Categories Are There?, 41 
NOVA L. REV. 221 (2017) (hereinafter Fora Categories); Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the 
Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 300 (2009) (hereinafter Ongoing Mystery). 
89.   A “limited public forum” is typically defined as a governmental property which the govern-
ment has reserved as a forum for expression “‘for certain groups or for the discussion of certain top-
ics.’” Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015).  
90.   A so-called “nonpublic forum” has long been described as “[p]ublic property which is not 
by tradition or designation a forum for public communication.”  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).  As I have previously observed: “Because we are dealing, 
by definition, with public–and not private–property, the term [‘non-public forum’] is something of a 
misnomer.  It would be more accurate to speak, in such a case, of a ‘public non-forum. . ..”  Rohr, 
Ongoing Mystery, supra note 88, at 302, n. 10. 
91.   Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
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context;92 Sotomayor, in a footnote, noted that fact, observing that no Justice in 
Tam had rejected it.93   
Proceeding to find the prohibition at issue “reasonable,” she said this: 
[T]he Government has an interest in not promoting certain kinds of 
speech, whether because such speech could be perceived as suggesting 
governmental favoritism or simply because the Government does not 
wish to involve itself with that kind of speech.  While “there is no evi-
dence that the public associates the contents of trademarks with the Fed-
eral Government,” registration nevertheless entails Government in-
volvement in promoting a particular mark.  Registration requires the 
Government to publish the mark, as well as to take steps to combat in-
ternational infringement.  The Government has a reasonable interest in 
refraining from lending its ancillary support to marks that are obscene, 
vulgar, or profane.94 
Compare, finally, the separate opinion of Justice Breyer, who would also 
have interpreted the word “scandalous” narrowly and upheld it as so nar-
rowed.95  But, as he has done before, Breyer stated his disinclination to be 
bound by the usual rules of First Amendment analysis, which he views as too 
rigid.96  Instead, employing what is essentially a balancing test, he “would ask 
whether the regulation at issue ‘works speech-related harm that is out of pro-
portion to its justifications.’”97  Applying that approach here, he joined Roberts 
and Sotomayor in finding both a minimal burden on speech98 and a reasonable 
government interest in dissociating itself from obscene or vulgar speech.99  But, 
in finding that the scale tipped in favor of the government in this case, he went 
further, adding these striking observations: 
 
92.   See text at notes 57–58, supra. 
93.   139 S. Ct. at 2316, n. 10. 
94.   Id. at 2317.  Sotomayor added that, with “scandalous” narrowly construed as she suggested, 
the provision would survive a facial overbreadth challenge.  Id. at 2318. 
95.   Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
96.   Id. , citing his opinion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234–36 (2015) (Breyer, 
J., concurring in the judgment).  See Clay Calvert, Iancu v. Brunetti’s Impact on First Amendment 
Law: Viewpoint Discrimination, Modes of Offensive Expression, Proportionality and Profanity, 43 
COLUM. J. L, & ARTS 37, 65-72 (2019) (hereinafter Impact).  
97.   Id. at 2305, quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).  One may question why Breyer, given his different analytical approach, joined 
the opinion of Justice Sotomayor.  He explained: “Because Justice Sotomayor reaches the same con-
clusions, using roughly similar reasoning, I join her opinion insofar as it is consistent with the views 
set forth here.”  139 S. Ct. at 2308.  
98.   Id. at 2306. 
99.   Id. at 2307. 
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[S]cientific evidence suggests that certain highly vulgar words have a 
physiological and emotional impact that makes them different in kind 
from most other words.  These vulgar words originate in a different part 
of our brains than most other words.  And these types of swear words 
tend to attract more attention and are harder to forget than other words 
. . . . 
These attention-grabbing words . . . threaten to distract consumers and 
disrupt commerce.  And they may lead to the creation of public spaces 
that many will find repellent, perhaps on occasion creating the risk of 
verbal altercations or even physical confrontations.  (Just think about 
how you might react if you saw someone wearing a t-shirt or using a 
product emblazoned with an odious racial epithet.)  The Government 
thus has an interest in seeking to disincentivize the use of such words 
in commerce by denying the benefit of trademark registration. 
 
Finally, although some consumers may be attracted to products labeled 
with highly vulgar or obscene words, others may believe that such 
words should not be displayed in public spaces where goods are sold 
and where children are likely to be present.  They may believe that 
trademark registration of such words could make it more likely that 
children will be exposed to public displays involving such words.  To 
that end, the Government may have an interest in protecting the sensi-
bilities of children by barring the registration of such words.100 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE OPINIONS 
A.  Viewpoint Discrimination 
The opinions of the Justices in Brunetti should lay to rest any lingering 
confusion regarding the significance of a finding of viewpoint discrimination 
by a governmental entity; it is unconstitutional per se, with no further analysis 
or “scrutiny” required.   
To some of us, that seemed clear all along. The concept of viewpoint dis-
crimination was first highlighted in Supreme Court opinions setting forth the 
rules applicable to restrictions on access, for purposes of expressive activity, to 
different categories of “forums”—i.e., governmentally-controlled properties or 
channels of communication.  Justice White, writing for the Court, first laid out 
those rules in 1983, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Association,101 saying this: 
 
100.   Id.  
101.   460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
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Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for 
public communication is governed by different standards . . . .[T]he 
State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative 
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not 
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose 
the speaker’s view.102 
White thereby identified two ways in which government, even when re-
stricting speech in a “non-public forum,” may be found to have violated the 
First Amendment: (1) when it did so “unreasonably,” or (2) when it discrimi-
nated on the basis of viewpoint.  He did not say that a finding of viewpoint 
discrimination would lead to further analysis.  His clear implication was that a 
finding of viewpoint discrimination would end the analysis; the government 
would lose the case. 
And so it remained, or so it seemed.  Notably, that is exactly what happened 
once the Court began to perceive instances of viewpoint discrimination; such a 
finding appeared to be fatal to the government’s case, as no consideration of 
possible justifications ensued.103  
Yet stray comments to the contrary occasionally surfaced, like the one that 
caps off this pronouncement, by Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in 
McCullen v. Coakley in 2014: 
Petitioners contend that the Act is not content neutral for two independ-
ent reasons: First, they argue that it discriminates against abortion-re-
lated speech because it establishes buffer zones only at clinics that per-
form abortions.  Second, petitioners contend that the Act, by exempting 
clinic employees and agents, favors one viewpoint about abortion over 
the other.  If either of these arguments is correct, then the Act must 
satisfy strict scrutiny–that is, it must be the least restrictive means of 
achieving a compelling state interest.104 
 
102.   Id. at 46.  Later in his opinion, White referred to this kind of government property—one 
that had not been opened to the citizenry for expressive activity—as a “non-public forum,” id. at 49, a 
designation that quickly caught on.  E.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 
473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).   
103.   See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001); Rosenberger v. 
Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836-37 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993).  See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416-17 (1989). 
104.   134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014). 
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Did Roberts really mean to say that there is no constitutional distinction 
between content discrimination and viewpoint discrimination?  Proceeding to 
find the statute at issue content-neutral, however, he said no more about it.105         
Recall, similarly, Justice Kennedy’s repeated statements in Tam, unambig-
uously linking a finding of viewpoint discrimination to “rigorous” or “height-
ened” judicial scrutiny.106  (Recall, too, that he wrote for four Justices.)  He 
added, once, that the statute “cannot survive this scrutiny,”107 but that pro-
nouncement was purely conclusory; no evidence of any typical “scrutiny” was 
provided.  And what scrutiny did he have in mind–some unexplained “super-
strict” scrutiny, or ordinary strict scrutiny (in which case the finding of view-
point discrimination would count for nothing)?  Again, Justice Alito, in Tam, 
said nothing regarding any form of scrutiny triggered by viewpoint discrimina-
tion. 
By the time the Court decided Brunetti, Kennedy was gone, having been 
replaced by Justice Kavanagh, and no Justice, in Brunetti, spoke of viewpoint 
discrimination leading to any form of further scrutiny.  Of the three Justices 
who had joined Kennedy’s opinion in Tam, one (Kagan) authored the majority 
opinion, while another (Sotomayor) wrote a partially concurring opinion, in 
Brunetti.  Neither of those opinions can be reasonably understood to mean, with 
respect to viewpoint discrimination, anything other than per se invalidity, with 
rare exception.108  We have hopefully heard the last of any judicial statements 
to the contrary. 
 
105.   Id. at 2530-34.  Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, joined by Justices Thomas and 
Kennedy, may be said to have contributed to the confusion, by finding viewpoint discrimination (with 
no clear consequence), yet reaching his conclusion (the invalidity of the statute) by applying strict 
scrutiny, triggered by content discrimination.  Id. at 2544–49 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  
Justice Alito, meanwhile, concurring in the judgment separately, found the statute viewpoint-discrim-
inatory, which, in his view, established its invalidity.  Id. at 2549–50 (Alito, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).  See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–96 (1992), in which Scalia, this time in 
a majority opinion, also found an ordinance to be discriminatory on the basis of viewpoint, but based 
his finding of invalidity on its failure, as  content-discriminatory, to satisfy strict scrutiny.  At least one 
scholar, however, views the ruling in R.A.V. as based on viewpoint discrimination.  Greenfield, supra 
note 57, at 186, 206.   
106.   See text at notes 62-65, supra.  Notably, the same approach was embraced by the majority 
of the Court of Appeals in Tam, in its en banc opinion.  808 F.3d 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
107.   See text at note 62, supra. 
108.   See note 67, supra, regarding exceptions to this rule.  Remarkably, at least one commentator, 
even after Brunetti, believes that a finding of viewpoint discrimination triggers strict scrutiny.  Green-
field, supra note 57, at 185, 212.  (But note that, near the end of an article in which he repeatedly 
displays that belief, he states: “Once a law falls into the ‘discriminates on the basis of viewpoint’ box, 
it is done for.” Id. at 228.)  Professor Calvert, however, appears to agree with my conclusion that 
viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional per se.  Calvert, Impact, supra note 96, at 81.  
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But because the unacceptability of viewpoint discrimination sufficed to re-
solve the First Amendment disputes in Tam and Brunetti, no other questions 
raised by the opinions therein were answered.  
B.   Trademark Registration Restrictions 
The most obvious question that lingers, in the wake of Brunetti, is whether 
Congress could successfully amend the Lanham Act by striking the word “im-
moral” and either (a) leaving the word “scandalous” in its place (making clear, 
in an accompanying committee report, that “scandalous” is now to be under-
stood as meaning what Justice Sotomayor, in Brunetti, said it could mean); or 
(b) replacing the word “scandalous” with some combination of the words “vul-
gar,” “profane,” and “obscene.”109  (Because any limitation imposed on an “ob-
scene” mark—if such can be imagined—would raise no First Amendment 
problem,110 I will simply use the word “vulgar” to denote this category of 
marks.)111   
A second question left open by Brunetti112 is whether any of the other enu-
merated bases for rejecting applications for federal trademark registration113 are 
vulnerable to First Amendment challenges.  Because all of those statutory cat-
egories are content-based (but viewpoint-neutral114), and because none of them 
advance government interests that are likely to be deemed “compelling,” it ap-
pears that, to successfully parry any such challenges, the government must have 
the benefit of a level of judicial review more relaxed than the “strict scrutiny” 
 
109.   Although Professor Greenfield has opined, without detailed analysis, that “[t]here is little 
doubt that the Court would uphold” such a provision, Greenfield, supra note 57, at 224, this author is 
not so sure.  Professor Calvert has considered the issue at length.  Calvert, Impact, supra note 96, at 
54–64. 
110.   Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
111.   The potential vagueness problem that may arise from such wording must be acknowledged, 
if not explored, here.  A law that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity 
to know what it means may be stricken as unduly vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause.  Vil-
lage of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).  Despite the fact 
that courts are more tolerant of vagueness in statutes that impose civil rather than criminal penalties, 
id. at 499, two of the judges who joined the majority in the Court of Appeals’ en banc ruling in Tam 
believed that the ban on registration of “disparaging” marks was unacceptably vague.  In re Tam, 808 
F.3d 1321, 1358–63 (O’Malley, J., concurring).The fact that three Justices have already indicated their 
willingness to allow the term “scandalous” to encompass vulgar, profane, and obscene marks, how-
ever, may alleviate any such concerns. 
112.   139 S. Ct. at 2302, n. *. 
113.   15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a)–(e). 
114.   See, with regard to “vulgar” marks, 139 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 2313 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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that would ordinarily be applied to a content-based restriction of expression.115  
Might that benefit be attainable?   
One way to get it is to employ Justice Breyer’s unique balancing ap-
proach116—but it may be an approach uniquely his.117  Another is the “minimal 
burden” approach, which, historically, appeared to obviate the need for any 
First Amendment analysis at all.118  As we have seen, that approach was con-
spicuously absent in Tam, but made something of a comeback in Brunetti in the 
opinions of three Justices, one of those being Breyer.119  Alternatively, the gov-
ernment’s chances improve greatly if the “limited public forum” analogy is ac-
cepted.  If all else fails, and if a bar to registration is deemed to burden only 
commercial speech, a form of so-called “intermediate” judicial scrutiny would 
be employed.120  I now address these possibilities, in turn. 
1.  Might the “Minimal Burden” Approach Be Resurrected? 
Only Chief Justice Roberts, in Brunetti, appeared to rely entirely on the 
view that a denial of trademark registration imposes a minimal burden on 
speech,121 while Justice Sotomayor linked it (albeit somewhat unclearly) to 
public-forum theory,122 and Justice Breyer incorporated it into his unique revi-
sion of general First Amendment rules.123  Moreover, each of those Justices 
expressed a willingness to lower the level of judicial scrutiny in connection 
with “vulgar”—i.e., “low-value”—speech. Would they do so otherwise?   
More importantly, might any other Justice join them in resurrecting the 
minimal-burden approach?  None did in Brunetti, but none had to, given the 
finding of fatal viewpoint discrimination.  The key question, I think, is whether 
it is logically possible to simultaneously accept both of the following conclu-
sions: (a) generally, denial of trademark registration imposes so minimal a 
 
115.   Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015).  Note, however, that Professor 
Calvert has suggested, based on the concurring opinions in Brunetti, the possibility “that statutes tar-
geting how something is said, and not the underlying content,” might not be treated as content-based.  
Calvert, Impact, supra note 96, at 76.   
116.  See text at notes 96–97, supra. 
117.   But see the concurring opinion of Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, 
in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We can ad-
minister our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws 
that in no way implicate its intended function.”)  See also Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consult-
ants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2357 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined 
by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan). 
118.   See text at note 46, supra. 
119.   See text at notes 78, 84, and 100, supra. 
120.   See text at note 148, infra. 
121.   See text at note 78, supra. 
122.   See text at notes 85–87, supra. 
123.   See text at notes 98–100, supra. 
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burden on speech that no First Amendment analysis is required; but, neverthe-
less (b) a denial based on viewpoint discrimination violates the First Amend-
ment.  But are not these two assertions mutually exclusive? Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion (joined by Breyer) gave some evidence of believing both of those state-
ments, but one may reasonably doubt that, beyond the context of “low-value” 
speech, any Justice is prepared to fully embrace a revived, full-fledged mini-
mal-burden approach to First Amendment challenges to trademark registration 
bars.  The fact that it wasn’t even discussed in the majority opinion, or in Tam, 
bolsters this conclusion.      
2.  Is the Principal Register a “Limited Public Forum”?    
“For the sake of the uninitiated,” I wrote not long ago, “forum” analysis 
“pertains to the issue of access, for expressive purposes, to governmentally-
controlled properties or channels of communication that have not traditionally 
been deemed available to the citizenry for such purposes.”124  The significance 
of this doctrine is the recognition that, in such settings, the government should 
enjoy considerably more discretion to limit speech than it otherwise has.125  The 
rules governing the exercise of that discretion in a so-called “non-public forum” 
were set forth earlier in this article.126  It is clear, by now, despite initial lack of 
clarity on the point,127 that the same First Amendment rules apply to limitations 
on expression in a so-called “limited public forum.”128  As I wrote earlier:  “Ra-
ther than being a sub-set of the designated public forum, as first appeared, the 
limited public forum turns out to be a non-identical twin of the non-public fo-
rum.”129  A restriction of speech in such a setting, to survive judicial scrutiny, 
thus need only be viewpoint-neutral and “reasonable.”  (While this “reasona-
bleness” standard is a relatively low bar, it is not invariably satisfied.130) 
 
124.   Marc Rohr, Fora Categories, supra note 88, at 222. 
125.   “The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property 
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”  Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 
(1966). 
126.   See text at notes 88-91, supra. 
127.   Marc Rohr, Ongoing Mystery, supra note 88, at 355. 
128.   Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001). 
129.   Marc Rohr, Fora Categories, supra note 88, at 233.  
130.   It was held to be not satisfied in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 
1888-91 (2018).  Said Chief Justice Roberts, for the majority:  
“[T]he State must draw a reasonable line.  Although there is no requirement of narrow tai-
loring in a nonpublic forum, the State must be able to articulate some sensible basis for dis-
tinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.” 
Id. at 1888.  Again, the Court has essentially equated the nonpublic forum with the limited public 
forum, for analytical purposes. 
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But what is a “limited public forum”?  It was probably best defined, by 
Justice Ginsburg, as follows, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: “[G]overn-
mental entities establish limited public forums by opening property ‘limited to 
use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain sub-
jects.’”131  Several years ago, when I believed it mattered, I explored the dis-
tinction between the “limited public forum” and the “non-public forum” in 
depth.132  But, as I have indicated, that distinction (to the extent that there is 
one133) no longer matters.  What does matter here, I submit, is whether the 
PTO’s Principal Register is a “forum” at all.134 
I contend that it is not.  In every case that reached the Supreme Court in 
which a “forum” determination was dispositive, even those in which the forum 
at issue was more “metaphysical”135 than tangible,136 it was possible to conceive 
of a speaker who sought access to that “forum” for the purpose of expressing 
himself therein.  That simply is not true in this context.  Rejection of an appli-
cation for registration burdens speech, by denying the user of a particular mark 
(which, again, is a form of speech) the benefits of federal registration, but the 
applicant is not seeking to speak on (or in) the Principal Register.  An applicant 
speaks in her application for registration, but no one is denied that opportunity.  
The Register is a database, in which the applicant hopes to have his mark 
listed.137   
In its decision in Brunetti, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit re-
jected the government’s “limited public forum” argument, essentially because 
“the trademark registration program bears no resemblance to” previously-iden-
tified limited forums.138  The majority opinion in Brunetti, at the Supreme 
Court, said nothing regarding this point, but, again, Justice Alito, writing for 
four Justices (all of whom remain on the Court) in Tam, expressly declined to 
rule out the applicability of a “limited forum” analogy.139  Meanwhile, Justice 
 
131.   561 U.S. 661, 679, n. 11 (2010). 
132.   Rohr, Ongoing Mystery, supra note 88, at 326–31. 
133.   Some courts have appeared to view the two terms as synonyms.  See, e.g., Milestone v. City 
of Monroe, 665 F.3d 774, 783 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011) (referring to “[a] limited public forum– sometimes 
called a ‘non-public forum.’”) 
134.   Note Justice Kennedy’s statement, in Arkansas Educational Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 
523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998), after discussing traditional and designated public fora, that “[o]ther govern-
ment properties are either non-public fora or not fora at all.”  See also U.S. v. American Library Ass’n, 
Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003).  
135.   E.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
136.   E.g., U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
137.   But recall that the Court in Tam rejected the characterization of this database as “govern-
ment speech,” 137 S. Ct. at 1760, a designation which would have obviated the need for any further 
First Amendment scrutiny. 
138.   In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
139.   See text at notes 57–58, supra. 
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Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer in Brunetti, invoked the concept somewhat 
obliquely in support of her “minimal burden” analysis.140   
Might five Justices find the concept–or something close enough thereto–
applicable here?  Skepticism seems appropriate. 
3.  Is Commercial-Speech Analysis Applicable? 
Commercial speech, as a First Amendment concept, is typically defined as 
“speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”141  The 
typical trademark, which identifies the source of goods or services, would seem 
to qualify.142  But not all trademarks are typical.  As one court has observed: 
[T]he trademark infringement and false designation of origin provisions 
of the Lanham Act . . . do not employ the term “noncommercial.”  They 
do state, however, that they pertain only to the use of a mark “in con-
nection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of 
any goods or services,” or “in connection with any goods or services.”  
But courts have been reluctant to define those terms narrowly.  Rather, 
. . . “[t]he term ‘services’ has been interpreted broadly” and so “[t]he 
Lanham Act has . . . been applied to defendants furnishing a wide vari-
ety of non-commercial public and civic benefits.”143 
Recall that Justice Alito, writing for four Justices in Tam (a case involving 
a somewhat artistic mark), declined to decide whether commercial speech anal-
ysis was applicable,144 saying this en route to that non-decision: 
The Government and amici supporting its position argue that all trade-
marks are commercial speech.  They note that the central purposes of 
trademarks are commercial and that federal law regulates trademarks to 
promote fair and orderly interstate commerce.  Tam and his amici, on 
the other hand, contend that many, if not all, trademarks have an ex-
pressive component.  In other words, these trademarks do not simply 
identify the source of a product or service but go on to say something 
more, either about the product or the service, or some broader issue.  
 
140.   See text at notes 85–87, supra.  Breyer, writing separately, mused that “one can find some 
vague resemblance between trademark registration and what this Court refers to as a ‘limited public 
forum’ created by the government for private speech.”  Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2305. 
141.   Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
142.   See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 
(1979); and text at notes 34–35, supra. 
143.   Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 314 (4th Cir. 2005). 
144.   See text at note 59, supra.  The point was also sidestepped by Justice Kennedy, writing for 
four other Justices, Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
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The trademark in this case illustrates this point.  The name ‘The Slants’ 
not only identifies the band but expresses a view about social issues.145 
Given this duality, Alito ultimately “[left] open the question whether Cen-
tral Hudson provides the appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges 
to provisions of the Lanham Act.”146  In her majority opinion in Brunetti (as 
noted earlier), Justice Kagan expressly declined to “say anything about how to 
evaluate viewpoint-neutral restrictions on trademark registration.”147  We have 
therefore been left with no hint of whether anyone on the Court would employ 
commercial speech analysis in this context.  If so, the governing Central Hud-
son test would allow the suppression of false or misleading speech, but other-
wise require a “substantial” government interest and a regulation that “directly 
advances” that interest without doing so overinclusively.148   
4.  Could a Ban on Registration of “Vulgar” Marks Be Upheld? 
If a sufficient number of Justices were inclined to employ intermediate 
scrutiny, might a ban on registration of “vulgar” marks survive?  Would the 
government be seen as having a sufficiently “substantial” interest in such a ban?  
Alternatively, if limited-forum analysis were deemed to apply, would such a 
ban satisfy the less-demanding “reasonableness” requirement? 
Either analysis must begin by articulating a plausible government interest.  
In Brunetti, Justice Sotomayor spoke of the government’s interest “in refraining 
from lending its ancillary support to” such marks,149 while Justice Breyer spoke 
of the government’s interest in disassociating itself from such speech.150  It is 
far from clear that any interest of that kind would be deemed “substantial,” as 
intermediate scrutiny would require.151  Recall that Breyer went on to identify 
other government interests supporting a ban on the registration of vulgar marks: 
 
145.   Id. at 1764.  
146.   Id., note 17. 
147.   Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302, n. *. 
148.   Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  
But Justice Thomas, as he reminded us in his brief concurrence in Tam, has long advocated the general 
use of strict scrutiny even in commercial speech cases.  137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).  
149.   Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
150.   Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
151.   The Court of Appeals, in Brunetti, ruled that “the government’s general interest in protect-
ing the public from marks it deems ‘off-putting’” was not a substantial interest.  In re Brunetti, 877 
F.3d 1330, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  
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preventing the disruption of commerce, preventing altercations, and protecting 
the sensibilities of children.152  Any one of those might suffice. 
But it seems far less likely that such a ban would be found to satisfy the 
parts of the Central Hudson test requiring a demonstrable “fit” between means 
and ends.  For one thing, the Court has incorporated into this form of suppos-
edly “intermediate” scrutiny a demanding “proof” requirement; the burden of 
justifying a restriction of commercial speech, said Justice Kennedy, 
is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmen-
tal body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must 
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will 
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.153 
As the Court of Appeals noted in its Brunetti opinion, a registration ban 
does not prevent use of the mark, thus failing to achieve the goal of protecting 
the sensibilities of the citizenry.154  That Court complained, as well, that the 
exclusion of “immoral or scandalous” marks was so fraught with subjectivity 
and unpredictability that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test—requir-
ing no more regulation than necessary—could also not be satisfied.155  
For another, the Court has arguably required that the government’s ra-
tionale, when it regulates commercial speech, bear some relationship to the 
commercial nature of the speech.  Thus, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc.,156 the Court struck down an ordinance that, in an effort to promote 
aesthetics and safety, treated newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills” 
worse than other newsracks, because the city’s interests had nothing to do with 
the commercial nature of the disfavored newsracks.  For the majority, Justice 
Stevens said this: 
Cincinnati has not asserted an interest in preventing commercial harms 
by regulating the information distributed by respondent publishers’ 
newsracks, which is, of course, the typical reason why commercial 
speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncom-
mercial speech.157  
 
152.   See text at note 100, supra. 
153.   Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993). 
154.   Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1353. 
155.   Id. at 1354. 
156.   507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
157.   Id. at 426. 
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Similarly, it can be argued that the harms identified by Justices Sotomayor 
and Breyer (other than the vague suggestion of disruption of commerce) are not 
“commercial” in nature.158  
If, instead, the “limited forum” analysis were to be employed, there seems 
little doubt that all of the suggested government interests would be deemed 
“reasonable”—particularly given the fact that three Justices have already re-
vealed their approval of that conclusion, either expressly159 or implicitly.160 
Finally, with respect to “vulgar” marks, the “low-value speech” approach 
reflected in Justice Alito’s Brunetti opinion161 would also support such a regis-
tration ban. 
5.  Are Other Bars to Trademark Registration Vulnerable to First Amendment 
Challenges? 
As noted briefly above, the Lanham Act lists many more categories of un-
registrable marks.162  For the purposes of this discussion, they can be separated 
into four macro-categories: those whose exclusion comports with (a) the fun-
damental requirement of distinctiveness as a condition of receiving legal pro-
tection, (b) the laudable goal of preventing consumer deception, or (c) the over-
riding statutory goal of preventing consumer confusion as to source or 
sponsorship; and (d) those whose rationale for rejection is more difficult to di-
vine. 
In the first group are marks that are “merely descriptive of” the applicant’s 
goods or services163 or “primarily geographically descriptive of them.”164  But 
an applicant can overcome either of these presumptive hurdles by showing that 
its mark has attained “secondary meaning”165—meaning that a substantial seg-
ment of the relevant group of consumers has come to think of the mark primar-
ily as an indication of source, rather than as a descriptive term.166  Compare a 
“generic” mark—one which consists of “the common name of a product or 
 
158.   Justice Kennedy, in Tam, observed that “[w]hether a mark is disparaging bears no plausible 
relation to” the goal of facilitating source identification.  137 S. Ct. at 1768. 
159.   See text at notes 94 and 99, supra. 
160.   See text at note 79, supra. 
161.   See text at note 77, supra. See also Gary Myers, It’s Scandalous—Limiting Profane Trade-
mark Registrations After Tam and Brunetti, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. LAW 1, 17-18 (2019).  I discuss the 
concept of “low-value speech” in Part III-C, infra. 
162.   See text at notes 16-25, supra.   
163.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).   
164.   Id. § 1052(e)(2). 
165.   Tartell v. South Florida Sinus and Allergy Center, Inc., 790 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 
2015); OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2009).  The concept is codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
166.   Tartell, 790 F.3d at 1257. 
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service”—which can never enjoy trademark protection,167 as the Lanham Act 
clearly implies.168  Note that all of these rules exist at common law, as well as 
under the Lanham Act.169  And bear in mind that anyone can use a descriptive 
or generic mark; they simply will have no legal protection therefor. 
In the second group are “deceptive” marks,170 marks that are “deceptively 
misdescriptive of” the applicant’s goods or services,171 and those that are “pri-
marily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them.”172  Of these, only 
“deceptively misdescriptive” marks can be registered with a showing of sec-
ondary meaning.173  This macro-category is special, in that one may not only 
be disabled from registering a deceptive mark; false-advertising laws may pre-
vent its use as well.174 
 The third macro-category above is represented, unambiguously, only by 
the provision barring the registration of a mark that “so resembles a mark reg-
istered in the [PTO], or a mark . . . previously used, . . . as to be likely . . . to 
cause confusion.”175 
The remaining statutory categories of disqualified marks are these: first, a 
mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises . . . matter which may . . . falsely suggest 
a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national sym-
bols”176 (hereinafter “false suggestion of connection”); second, a mark that 
 
167.   Royal Crown Co., Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
168.   15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). 
169.   Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2nd Cir. 1976); J. Thomas 
McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 14:1 (5th edition 2019).  
170.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).  A “deceptive” mark is misdescriptive of some characteristic of the 
product, when prospective purchasers are likely to believe the misdescription and be influenced by it.  
In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  “Deceptive” marks are also denied common 
law protection.  In re Spirits Int’l N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
171.   Id. § 1052(e)(1).   
172.   Id. § 1052(e)(3).  See also that part of § 1052(a) pertaining to geographical misdescriptions 
of the place of origin of wines or spirits. 
173.    Id. § 1052(f).  Comparisons of, and distinctions between, these particular categories can 
be found in In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1336-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Gold Seal 
Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 934–35 (D,D.C. 1955), aff’d,  230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956).   
174.   The Lanham Act contains a false advertising prohibition, at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).  In 
addition, “[t]he Federal Trade Commission has the authority to act against ‘unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices,’ including false or misleading statements in advertising, where those statements harm con-
sumers.  The law in some states provides for similar remedies, frequently under the state’s version of 
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.”  Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis, Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition: Law and Policy 870 (4th ed. 2014).  
175.   15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).  (But note the possibility of concurrent registrations of the same mark 
by different users, if the Director of the PTO determines that confusion “is not likely to result from the 
continued use by more than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and limitations 
as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods on or in connection with which such marks 
are used.”  Id.) 
176.   Id. § 1052(a).  See, e.g., In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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“[c]onsists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the 
United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any 
simulation thereof”177 (hereinafter “government insignia”); third, a mark that 
“[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular 
living individual except by his written consent”178 (hereinafter “living individ-
ual”); fourth, a mark that “[c]onsists of or comprises a . . . name, signature, or 
portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his 
widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow”179 (hereinafter “de-
ceased president”); and, fifth, a mark which “is primarily merely a surname.”180  
Only the last  of these may be registered181 (or protected under the common 
law182) if a showing of secondary meaning can be made. 
The reasons for these categories of ineligible marks are not always obvious, 
but some have been authoritatively suggested, and, even in the absence of any 
such suggestions, we can speculate.   
A mark which “falsely suggests a connection”—with anything—can easily 
be understood as deceptive, and thus may plausibly be added to our second 
macro-category.  (We will overlook the potential overlap with the “deceptive” 
and “deceptively misdescriptive” categories).  We are then left to wonder why 
a separate category of ineligible marks comprises names of living persons un-
less they consent; if the concern here is, again, a false suggestion of a connec-
tion, that concern has already been addressed.  Or is this provision motivated 
by a concern about “privacy,” even in the absence of a false suggestion of a 
connection?  This rationale has been suggested.183   
The “deceased president” provision also seems to overlap, in part, with the 
“false suggestion of connection” prohibition, and, oddly, it is limited, in its ap-
plication beyond that, to references to deceased presidents (but even then 
there’s no problem if the “widow” doesn’t mind).  So, pursuant to this particular 
provision, registration of a mark embodying a portrait of George H.W. Bush 
would not be barred (because his wife is also deceased), but registration of a 
mark consisting of a portrait of Jimmy Carter (still alive, as of this writing), 
 
177.  Id. § 1052(b). 
178.   Id. § 1052( c). 
179.   Id. 
180.   Id. § 1052(e)(4). 
181.   Id. § 1052(f). 
182.   McCarthy, supra note 169, 13:2. 
183.   Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. v. Carrie Beverage–Missouri, Inc., 989 F.2d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 1993); 
University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983); Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure sec. 1206, www.TMEP/uspto.gov (October 
2018) (“The purpose of requiring the consent of a living individual to the registration of his or her 
name, signature, or portrait is to protect rights of privacy and publicity that living persons have in the 
designations that identify them.”)  
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after his death, would be—unless Mrs. Carter allowed it.  This prohibition 
seems, then, to be motivated by solicitude for the feelings of a presidential 
“widow.”   
Is the “government insignia” provision motivated, as well, by a concern 
about a false implication of governmental imprimatur?  But here, too, there is 
arguable redundancy, as the “false suggestion of connection” provision in-
cludes a reference to “national symbols.”  (Admittedly, the “flag” provision is 
not limited to “national” insignia.)  Might the “flag” provision have been moti-
vated, then, by respect for such symbols, such that no one gets to wrap his prod-
uct in a flag, as it were, even if secondary meaning could be shown?  So it 
seems.  According to Professor McCarthy, this absolute bar to registration 
is apparently founded upon the thinking that these kinds of governmen-
tal insignia, such as a national flag or seal, should not be registered as 
symbols of origin for commercial goods and services.  That is, these 
kinds of governmental insignia ought to be kept solely to signify the 
government and not be sullied or debased by use as symbols of business 
and trade.184 
   (But keep in mind that this is a bar to registration, not to use, of such 
marks.) 
Finally, what about marks that are “primarily surnames”?  In his treatise on 
trademark law, Professor McCarthy says this: 
Personal names [surnames and first names] are placed by the common 
law into that category of noninherently distinctive terms which require 
proof of secondary meaning for protection . . . . The key is whether the 
public will likely perceive the term as a personal name . . . .185  
But why are personal-name marks presumptively unprotected?  It has been 
suggested that the rule rests on the belief that, generally, a personal name lacks 
the distinctiveness required for trademark protection.186  Professor McCarthy 
has written: 
 
184.   McCarthy, supra note 169, 19:78. 
185.   McCarthy, supra note 169, 13:2.   
186.   See In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  According to the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 14 cmt. e (1995): 
The rationale of requiring proof of secondary meaning for personal names is somewhat 
analogous to that applicable to descriptive terms.  The known multiplicity of similar 
personal names may make consumers hesitant to assume a common source for products 
bearing a particular name.  
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A possible rationale for the requirement of secondary meaning in per-
sonal name marks is that such marks are analogous to descriptive terms.  
A personal name is like a descriptive term in that it is not inherently 
distinctive because it merely describes some attribute of the product 
(the name of a person who is involved in the business) . . . .187  
In addition, he adds, “no one seller should have the right to prevent others 
from using a descriptive term to honestly describe their goods or services by 
telling the name of a person involved.”188  The Lanham Act’s “surname” regis-
tration bar, then, may be understood as advancing the “distinctiveness” require-
ment for trademark protection.  
Might any of these bars to registration be vulnerable to a First Amendment 
challenge?  To my knowledge, no such legal challenges have been brought in 
the past, probably, in part, because the “minimal burden” approach was firmly 
in place as a result of First Amendment arguments raised unsuccessfully by 
disappointed users of “immoral or scandalous” marks.189  As we have seen, that 
approach may not have been entirely abandoned.190  Even if too few Justices 
are willing to embrace that approach, the “limited public forum” analogy, if 
adopted, would, again, allow these prohibitions to stand on a simple showing 
of “reasonableness” (since none of them are viewpoint-based).  But, again, that 
is a questionable conclusion,191 leaving us with the likelihood that these bars to 
registration would be subjected to intermediate judicial scrutiny as burdens on 
commercial speech.   
Per that analysis, I submit that it is almost inconceivable that a court would 
invalidate any of the statutory limitations that are designed to further the goals 
of preventing deception, dispelling consumer confusion, or requiring distinc-
tiveness as a condition for legal protection.  These goals should be deemed to 
be substantial state interests, and the denial of legal protection to such marks 
should be seen as advancing those interests.  To the extent that any of these 
statutory provisions mirrors the common law (i.e., tradition), the argument for 
its validity should be even stronger.  But the “deceased president” and “gov-
ernment insignia” categories seem vulnerable to challenge; the apparent gov-
ernment interests supporting these provisions are not only weak, but non-com-
mercial as well. 
 
187.   McCarthy, supra note 169, 13:3. 
188.   Id.  See also Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 989 (7th Cir. 2004).  
189.   See text at note 46, supra. 
190.   See text at notes 78, 82–84, and 98, supra. 
191.   See text at notes 135–38, supra. 
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C.  Is There a Future for the Concept of “Low-Value” Speech? 
It has been a “bedrock principle” of First Amendment law, for nearly five 
decades, if not longer, that, absent a “captive audience” situation,192 speech can-
not be punished or suppressed merely because it offends.193  A prime reason for 
this “rule” is the perceived impossibility of drawing clear and appropriate lines 
of demarcation between speech that could or could not be outlawed, were the 
rule to be altered.194  But three of the opinions in Brunetti may lead a reasonable 
reader to wonder whether any Justice is now prepared to allow some regulation 
of “vulgar” speech, based on its ostensibly “low value.”195 
Granted, as Justice Sotomayor recognized,196 a willingness to allow denial 
of registration of a “vulgar” mark is quite different from a willingness to allow 
its use to be disallowed.  But, still, Justice Alito, in an admittedly brief concur-
rence, referred to “vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of 
ideas.”197  And Justice Breyer spoke at length of the harmful effects of “these 
types of swear words.”198  And Sotomayor, while linking her view of such lan-
guage to the “minimal burden” approach, would allow the PTO to deny regis-
tration, as “scandalous” marks, to “the small group of lewd words or ‘swear’ 
words that cause a visceral reaction, that are not commonly used around chil-
dren, and that are prohibited in comparable settings”199–a position seemingly 
compatible with the difficult task of drawing lines in this end of the speech 
spectrum.  
The notable exception to the Court’s “bedrock principle” regarding speech 
that offends is, of course, its 1978 decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 
upholding the sanction imposed by the Federal Communications Commission 
on a radio station for broadcasting the famous George Carlin “Filthy Words” 
monologue (which featured some very vulgar words indeed) during daytime 
hours.200  For the majority, Justice Stevens, in an opinion that lacked any formal 
analytical structure, emphasized the special nature of the broadcast medium,201 
 
192.   Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
193.   Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
194.   Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25. 
195.   See generally Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. L. REV. 547 (1989).  Professor 
Calvert has also raised this question.  Calvert, Impact, supra note 96, at 79–81. 
196.   See text at note 84, supra. 
197.   See text at note 77, supra. 
198.   See text at note 100, supra. 
199.   See text at note 83, supra.  She did not clarify her reference to “comparable settings.” 
200.   438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
201.   Id. at 748. 
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its entry into “the privacy of the home,”202 and its accessibility to children.203  
In a part of his opinion joined only by two other Justices, Stevens—even while 
reiterating that “the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a suffi-
cient reason for suppressing it”—204 said this, regarding the offending content 
of the Carlin monologue: 
These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends.  Their 
place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly sketched 
by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: “Such utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”205 
The offending words could thus be banned from midday broadcasts.  Justice 
Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, stated that, while he concurred in the judg-
ment, he did “not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are free 
generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the 
First Amendment is most ‘valuable’ and hence deserving of the most protec-
tion, and which is less ‘valuable’ and hence deserving of less protection.”206  
The Pacifica ruling, unique in its bypassing the application of strict scrutiny to 
a content-based regulation of speech, has never been overruled. 
“Cable” television, it soon turned out, would be treated differently (so that 
content restrictions thereon would be subject to strict scrutiny), based on the 
questionable distinction that, presumably unlike broadcast television, “cable 
television is not an uninvited intruder.”207  The distinction has subsequently 
been questioned by some Justices.208   
The FCC, while the details of its regulatory scheme have changed over 
time,209 has continued to enforce the statutory ban on “indecent or profane” 
 
202.   Id.  
203.   Id. at 749. 
204.   Id. at 745. 
205.   Id. at 746, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
206.   438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
207.   Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F.Supp. 1099, 1113 (D. Utah 1985), 
aff’d sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Wilkinson v. Jones, 
480 U.S. 926 (1987).  
208.   Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744 (1996) (plu-
rality opinion of Breyer, J.), 812–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
209.   See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox II), 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2312-14 (2012).  The 
post-Pacifica history of this regulatory regime is revealed, in part, in Action for Children’s Television 
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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language on broadcast radio or television.210  The Supreme Court has, thus far, 
declined to revisit the First Amendment questions raised by these restrictions,211 
but at least two Justices have voiced criticism of the Pacifica ruling.  In a con-
curring opinion in the first Fox decision, in 2009, Justice Thomas said this: 
I write separately . . . to note the questionable viability of the two prec-
edents that support the FCC’s assertion of constitutional authority to 
regulate the programming at issue in this case.  [Here he cited Pacifica 
and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.212] [These decisions] were un-
convincing when they were issued, and the passage of time has only 
increased doubt regarding their continued validity . . . .213 
 
Even if this Court’s disfavored treatment of broadcasters under the First 
Amendment could have been justified at the time of Red Lion and 
Pacifica, dramatic technological advances have eviscerated the factual 
assumptions underlying those decisions.  Broadcast spectrum is signif-
icantly less scarce than it was 40 years ago . . . .214 
 
Moreover, traditional broadcast television and radio are no longer the 
“uniquely pervasive” media forms they once were . . . .I am open to re-
consideration of Red Lion and Pacifica in the proper case.215 
In Fox II, in 2012, the late Justice Ginsburg said this: 
In my view, the Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation was 
wrong when it issued.  Time, technological advances, and the Commis-
sion’s untenable rulings in the cases now before the Court show why 
Pacifica bears reconsideration.216 
The “cases now before the Court” in Fox II involved nudity or the “isolated” 
utterance of expletives that would be on anyone’s list of vulgar words.217  While 
neither Justice Thomas nor Justice Ginsburg addressed the concept of “low-
 
210.   18 U.S.C. § 1464.  See also 47 U.S.C. sec. 303. 
211.   Fox, 132 S. Ct. at 2320; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I), 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 
(2009). 
212.   395 U.S. 367 (1969), upholding FCC rules requiring broadcast stations to afford free reply 
time to the target of a personal attack on a station’s airwaves.  Justice White, for the Court, emphasized 
the “scarcity of broadcast frequencies.” 
213.   129 S. Ct. at 1819–20 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
214.   Id. at 1821. 
215.   Id. at 1822. 
216.   Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
217.   Id. at 2315–16. 
ROHR_MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/21  1:45 PM 
2020 FIRST AMENDMENT AND TRADEMARK REGISTRATION 137 
 
value” speech, their disapproval of Pacifica makes clear enough their rejection 
of it as a viable constitutional principle.   
Counterposed against Justice Thomas are the three Justices (again, Alito, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor) whose opinions in Brunetti sparked this discussion.  
The remaining four members of the Court, as of this writing—Roberts, Kagan, 
Gorsuch, and Kavanagh—said nothing in Brunetti about the value of “vulgar” 
speech; it may or may not be telling that they bypassed the opportunity to join 
any of the three opinions that did.  Might any of them support the “low-value 
speech” concept in a future case in which the issue is squarely raised, perhaps 
a revisiting of Pacifica, or even a reconsideration of Cohen v. California?218  
The arc of First Amendment law tends toward ever greater protection of speech, 
but the opinions of three Justices in Brunetti raise reasonable doubts, I submit, 
concerning the Court’s  willingness to abandon its adherence to its outlier de-
cision in Pacifica. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s rulings in Brunetti and Tam make clear that, as a general prin-
ciple of First Amendment law, viewpoint discrimination on the part of govern-
ment will not be tolerated.  That alone suffices to explain the Court’s invalida-
tion of the Lanham Act’s “disparagement” and “immorality” bars to federal 
registration of trademarks.  But the concurring opinions in Brunetti raise the 
possibility that a viewpoint-neutral amendment to the Act prohibiting the reg-
istration of “vulgar” marks might withstand a First Amendment challenge.  The 
constitutionality of such a legislative response to Brunetti might rest on the 
characterization of the PTO’s Principal Register as a limited public forum, the 
resurrection of the seemingly-discredited (by Tam) “minimal-burden” view of 
denials of registration, and/or a willingness to treat “vulgar” marks as “low-
value” speech.  The likelihood of any of those approaches commanding a Su-
preme Court majority, however, seems small.  Meanwhile, other provisions of 
the Lanham Act that bar registration of particular categories of marks, for non-
commercial reasons, now appear vulnerable to First Amendment challenges.  
Finally, those same concurring opinions suggest that the concept of “low-
value” speech is not extinct, a suggestion that has implications for other First 
Amendment contexts.   
 
 
218.   Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), famously upheld the First Amendment right to wear a jacket 
bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in a corridor of a county courthouse. 
